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I.Introduction 
 
The interpretation of Quesnay´s contributions to economics has always been 
(and remains) highly controversial. On a more general plane they range from one 
extreme, where Quesnay and the Physiocrats are seen as defenders of “feudalism” and 
the Ancien Regime to the other extreme where they are depicted as promoters of 
unbridled economic liberalism under capitalism. Between these extremes there are all 
sorts of intermediate positions and also those who point out that the Physiocratic system 
of ideas is fundamentally contradictory
1
.  
Matters are not made any easier by the fact that the scope of what one means by 
Physiocracy can be and is defined in at least five different levels, often not made totally 
explicit by commentators. Here we have at one extreme the Physiocratic movement 
being very broadly defined to include a set of economists that may range from 
Cantillon, who preceded Quesnay, to Turgot, who came much after Quesnay and his 
contemporaries. A second definition goes from Quesnay and his contemporaries, who 
presented themselves as Physiocrats, all the way to Turgot. A third would be more 
narrow and include in the proper Physiocrats only Quesnay and his contemporaries. A 
fourth one would deal strictly with Quesnay´s own writings. And, at the other extreme, 
there is a fifth view that discusses the issues only in terms of what can actually be found 
in the various versions of Quesnay´s famous Tableau Économique. Marx appears at 
times to follow the first of these views and we are more inclined towards defining 
Physiocracy according to the second. But all of them can be useful in a particular 
context, as long as the adopted view is used consistently and stated explicitly. In this 
work we are concerned strictly with Quesnay´s own writings but not exclusively with 
the Tableaux (contrary to the fifth option above). This paper is an attempt, necessarily 
modest due to the intrinsic difficulty of the topic and the vast and controversial 
literature, to shed some light on the ‘rational foundation’ of some aspects of Quesnay´s 
theory. We want to discuss the question of Quesnay´s view of the capitalist character of 
modern agriculture and are also particularly concerned with some issues raised by 
Sraffa (and much earlier by Marx) concerning the central role of the physical surplus (of 
grains) in Quesnay´s theory, a role that is sometimes denied by commentators given the 
fact that the produit net is actually defined as a value magnitude. 
                                                          
1
 For a critical survey of these disparate views see McNally (1990). 
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As a tool, we make use of a simple formalization of the necessary connections 
between assumptions about the techniques in use, the distribution of income between 
the classes and sectors and the system of relative prices. We argue that Quesnay´s 
system depicted a truly capitalist agrarian economy with nothing feudal about it. And 
we try to show that he was indeed a pioneer of the classical political economy/surplus 
approach to economics as identified first by Marx, Sraffa and Garegnani, the physical 
surplus of grains being the necessary basis for his analysis of distribution of income and 
relative prices. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II deals briefly 
with the historical background of Quesnay´s work. Section III recalls the main ideas of 
the Physiocratic system. Section IV discusses the analytical role of the physical surplus 
of grain. Section V deals with relative prices. Section VI examines the distributive 
variables in the context of a vertically integrated grain sector. Section VII discusses the 
role of profits and capital accumulation. Section VIII offers brief final remarks. 
 
II. Historical Background. 
 
Quesnay´s economic writings were written between 1756 and 1774 during the 
reign of Louis XV. At that time France is increasingly lagging behind England from 
both the economic and political point of view. Indeed, France´s 1763 defeat against 
England in the Seven Years War was a clear demonstration of the decline of French 
power. Economically, France at the time was relatively underdeveloped, going through 
endemic food scarcity and periodic famines. Quesnay himself estimated that the 
population of the country had fallen from 24 to 16 million people from 1650 and 1750. 
Though the reliability of his exact figures may be open to question, there seems to have 
been a declining trend. 
Quesnay and the Physiocrats were concerned with the issue of good governance 
that would allow France to regain its supremacy in Europe from the political, military or 
economic point of view. In the conception of the Physiocrats, wealth was the basis of 
the power of a nation. In their view, the only way for France to compete with its 
powerful English neighbor was, then, to increase the country's wealth. Quesnay saw 
wealth as being the result of production, not of trade. For him the main purpose of the 
French government should be the implementation of reforms that could increase the size 
of the surplus product of the economy, which he called produit net (net product). In this 
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sense Quesnay is clearly following the tradition that started much earlier in England 
with William Petty
2
.  
Quesnay and the Physiocrats consider that Political Economy is the study of the 
functioning of society, according to the principles of the Ordre Naturel (natural order), 
a principle seen as having a permanent intrinsic logic and optimal nature. The name 
Physiocrat
3
, which they attributed to themselves, clearly indicates that natural laws 
should prevail. So there are immutable natural laws that should be studied and taught. It 
is only by respecting these rules that the economic system of a country can reach its full 
potential. The diversity of human institutions would only be a reflection of the lack of 
knowledge of the natural order by both the people and the rulers. In the Physiocratic 
approach, the social order is immutable, natural and physical. For the Physiocrats, 
Political Economy should study this ‘social physical order’ as guided by natural laws. 
They define Political Economy as "a physical science, accurate, clear and complete, the 
science of law, order, and natural government"(Dupont de Nemours, quoted in Kuntz 
1982, 106). Quesnay and the Physiocrats had a materialist and scientific conception of 
society. In their view, material production determines both the structure and the mode of 
functioning of societies. Quesnay, in a handwritten note on a text by Mirabeau writes 
that “For us, everything is physical, and the moral comes from it”4 (Quesnay 1958, 
734). 
The ambition of the Physiocrats was always to influence the course of French 
history, in terms of the adoption by its rulers of ‘good policies’ that can secure a 
prosperous and powerful future to their country. Even if the work of Quesnay and the 
Physiocrats was the object of strong criticism and even some sarcasm
5
, that did not stop 
its wide diffusion at the time. Turgot, for example, became Controller-General of 
Finances (the minister in charge of finances in France during the Ancien Régime) of 
                                                          
2
 It is interesting to note that, when Petty wrote his major works, in the mid-seventeenth century, he was 
also concerned with the means to ensure the prosperity of England and a prominent place for his country 
at the European level. England at the time, which had not even been invited to the peace negotiations of 
Westphalia in 1648, was clearly behind economically and militarily if compared with Holland and 
France, the two great powers in this period. The major concern of Petty was the threat to British 
sovereignty represented by the constant development of French power. When Quesnay writes a century 
later, the situation is radically different (Aspromourgos 1996). 
3
 The name Physiocrat is formed from the Greek words fùsis (nature) and cratéin (dominate). 
4
 “pour nous, tout est physique, et le moral en dérive”. 
5
 Voltaire said, speaking of the work of the Physiocrats, that "many useful things were written about 
agriculture, but, everybody read them, but the farmers" (Rioux 1989, 38). 
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Louis XVI in 1774 and tried to implement a program largely inspired by Physiocratic 
theses, which will be repealed later
6
. 
Besides, wanting to discover and expose the laws of natural order, the 
Physiocrats had the political ambition to implement these rules in the economy and in 
the society when they were not respected. They defended the idea of adopting a 
despotisme légal (legal despotism), where the absolutist king should know and follow 
the laws of natural order and disseminate it in his kingdom, through education and the 
creation of a suitable legislative framework. The despotisme légal of the Physiocrats, a 
notion that led to a lot of confusion among analysts of their work, must be understood as 
a translation and dissemination of the laws of nature in the society so that it reaches a 
higher level of development. In the natural order, for example, private property is an 
essential droit naturel (natural right) because Quesnay was convinced that without 
private property the lands would not be cultivated. 
Quesnay dreams of an ‘Agricultural Kingdom’, where compliance with the laws 
of natural order and a prosperous agriculture, using the most efficient techniques and 
organization, would ensure France a prominent place in the concert of nations. Given 
the scientific conception of the natural order, this ‘government of nature’ was actually a 
‘government of science’, where "If the torch of reason illuminates the government, all 
positive laws harmful to society and to the sovereign will disappear"
7
 (Quesnay 1958, 
741; Meek 1962 [1993], 55). He believes that absolutism is the best political system, but 
it must respect the rules of natural economic order, which was not the case in the France 
of Louis XV. Therefore, the absolutist government must help the introduction of 
capitalism in agriculture. By capitalism in agriculture, we here mean a system in which, 
in that sector, production is undertaken for money profit and workers work for a wage 
using   techniques which use a lot of produced means of production (and are owned by 
the capitalist farmers). It is important to note that we are not including in our definition 
of capitalism the free mobility of capital among different sectors and perhaps not even 
necessarily between different products within the same broad sector. Free capital 
mobility would characterize fully competitive capitalism for the whole economy, which 
of course was neither what Quesnay wrote about, nor existed at that time in France.  
                                                          
6
 The book of Edgar Faure, “La Disgrâce de Turgot” (the disgrace of Turgot) offers an extremely detailed 
description of the experience as a statesman of Turgot and the aborted attempts to implement policies of 
Physiocratic inspiration (Faure 1961). 
7
 "le flambeau de la raison [...] éclaire le gouvernement, toutes les lois positives nuisibles à la société et 
au souverain, disparaîtront". 
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It is interesting to note that the Physiocrats themselves set the rules of the game, 
i.e., ‘discovered’ the natural laws. In this sense, despotism serves the purpose of the 
Physiocrats because it ensures that these natural laws are respected and that the 
mechanisms of the ‘machine of prosperity’ designed by the Physiocrats can function 
correctly. Unlike Petty, Quesnay established a clear distinction between the tasks of the 
state and the role of civil society, even if Petty probably gave more emphasis to the role 
of the State. In fact, Petty often spoke indiscriminately of the State and the economy, 
not always distinguishing clearly the role of each one (Milgate & Stimson 2004). 
The accusation sometimes made against Quesnay of wanting to keep the feudal 
order intact, is thus unjustified. Quesnay is clearly part of the movement of the 
Enlightenment in the sense that he realizes the need for a reform of social and economic 
structures. Indeed, he wrote several articles for the Encyclopédie (Encyclopedia) of 
Diderot and d'Alembert
8
. 
Quesnay and the Physiocrats thus had a radical but reformist agenda, they 
wanted a ‘revolution from above’, in which the legal despot would stimulate the full 
development of capitalism in agriculture in order to increase the wealth and military 
power of the French state. As pointed out by McNally (1990) the point was not that the 
Physiocrats represented the interests of the existing agrarian bourgeoisie, since at that 
time this class did not really exist yet in France as a true political force. Quesnay´s point 
was that a massive expansion of capitalist farming in agriculture would be in the 
interests of the State and ultimately also of the landowners
9
. 
 
III . The Physiocratic System. 
 
Notwithstanding the limited diffusion of capitalism in French agriculture at the 
time, Quesnay´s theoretical system clearly describes a capitalist agrarian economy. 
Quesnay divides society into classes to explain the functioning of the economic system. 
The division of classes used by Quesnay does not reflect the economic or social 
hierarchy as it is usually presented. In the Physiocratic scheme, each class takes a 
particular role in the process of production and consumption. There are thus three 
                                                          
8
 The entries "Evidence" (evidence), "Fermiers" (farmers), "Grains" (grain), "Hommes" (men) and 
"Impôts" (taxes) were written to be inserted in the Encyclopédie, anonymously, because Quesnay feared 
reprisals by the real power that he served as court doctor. 
9
 Perhaps the political failure of the Physiocratic reforms before the revolution had more to do with the 
weakness of agrarian capitalist interests at the time. 
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classes, which interact with each other in a way that make the economic system work. 
The class Quesnay called ‘productive’, composed of the peasants, the agricultural 
workers and the capitalist farmers is in charge of agricultural production. The ‘sterile’ 
class refers to the artisans, merchants, firm owners and workers in manufacturing. It is 
responsible for all non-agricultural production, as well as trade. Finally, the class of 
‘landowners’ brings together the owners of land, the ‘decimators’ (the Church, which 
collects the tithe) and the king. These landlords make up a class that does not participate 
directly in production, but plays an important role in the economic system. 
The farmers are part of the same ‘productive’ class as the agricultural workers, 
but they do not share the same interests. The antagonism between these two groups has 
been well illustrated by the early phase of the French Revolution. 
According to Quesnay and the Physiocrats, agriculture was the only sector 
where a physical surplus is produced. They claimed that in the other sectors products 
were only transformed but not created. Throughout his economic works, Quesnay 
demonstrated, then, a strong interest in the issues related to agricultural production. This 
is not surprising because France was still a fundamentally rural country. 
Quesnay's originality was to identify the various methods of production that co-
existed in French agriculture of the time to show that each corresponds to a very 
different level of productivity. In the entry Fermiers (farmers) written for the 
Encyclopédie, Quesnay insists on the importance of the methods used in agriculture to 
determine the level of output that can be achieved: 
 
“The different ways to treat the land we cultivate and the causes that contribute to it, decide the 
products of agriculture. You must thoroughly know the different types of cultivations to judge 
the current situation of agriculture of the kingdom”10  
(Quesnay 1958, 427-428). 
 
The three types of cultivation identified by Quesnay were subsistence 
agriculture, the Petite culture (small-scale cultivation) and the Grande culture (large-
scale cultivation). Quesnay believes that subsistence agriculture is still present in many 
isolated regions of the kingdom (in mountains, for instance). This agriculture does not 
                                                          
10
 “Les différentes manières de traiter les terres que l’on cultive, et les causes qui y contribuent, décident 
des produits de l’agriculture; ce sont les différentes sortes de cultures, qu’il faut bien connaître pour 
juger de l’état actuel de l’agriculture dans le royaume”. 
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produce a surplus and only allows the survival in miserable conditions for those who 
practice it. It is not integrated in the market and Quesnay quickly eliminates it from his 
analysis because it is unrepresentative of French agricultural reality. Thus, Quesnay's 
theory of agricultural production is based on the fundamental distinction made between 
the Petite culture and the Grande culture. The difference between these two modes of 
cultivation is linked to both the scale and the type of relationship between the landlords 
and the agricultural producers. 
In the model of Grande Culture, present mainly in the northern regions of 
France, the farms are extensive and the leasehold is the dominant mode of production. 
The leasehold is a method of agricultural production where the landlord entrusts the 
operation of the farm to a fermier (farmer) who organizes the production as he wants 
and pays a fixed rent, regardless of the level of production. Modern techniques such as 
crop rotation for the land to rest are generally used. 
In the model of Petite Culture, however, the farms are small and the dominant 
mode of production is métayage (sharecropping), where the métayer (sharecropper) 
cultivates the land and delivers generally half of the product to the landlord. In this 
system there is strong pressure from the landlord to use ancient techniques that deplete 
the land. 
But the big difference between the two types of cultivation, according to 
Quesnay, is in the respective levels of productivity. In fact, the Grande culture is much 
more productive than the Petite Culture because it uses more capital, produced means of 
production which Quesnay called avances (advances). 
Quesnay notes that the cycle of agricultural production takes time, one year for 
example, in the case of cultivation in France. But, before getting the product, i.e., the 
harvest, there is a need to pay for many expenses, necessary for the production process 
to happen. These expenses constitute what Quesnay calls advances. Quesnay then 
shows that the advances are essential to the production process. The advances are the 
wages of agricultural workers for their livelihood, expenses to improve the quality of 
the land, the tools and the animals used for cultivation, as well as the food given to these 
animals
11
. It is interesting to note that advances also exist in manufacturing and in the 
production of handicrafts, according to the same principle (wages, tools, machines, 
factories, etc.). 
                                                          
11
 Trabucchi highlights the importance of animal food as part of the circulating capital of the farmers in 
Quesnay’s theory, but not in the Tableau (Trabucchi, 2008). 
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 Aspromourgos states that Quesnay “develops in his writings a definite 
conception of capital employed in the production system as ‘advances’ prior to the 
resulting output, both in agriculture and manufacture; though given the special role 
assigned to agriculture as the only surplus-producing sector, it is natural that he 
concentrates on the significance of capital advances in that sector” (Aspromourgos 
1996, 121).  
In the Physiocratic typology, the advances are of various types, with the avances 
annuelles (annual advances) the avances primitives (primitive advances) and the 
avances foncières (land advances). “The avances annuelles consist of the expenses which 
are annually incurred for the work of cultivation
12
” (Quesnay 1958, 795; Meek 1962 [1993], 
151). They consist of wages set at a subsistence level and the raw materials, what we 
now call circulating capital. The avances primitives are the durable means of 
production, such as horses, tools, what we now call the fixed capital, used to prepare the 
soil and improve production. The avances foncières are used for the improvement of the 
land. They are “the initial expenditures on clearing, draining, fencing, building” 
(Schumpeter 1954, 236). The avances foncières are considered permanent and the 
deterioration of this capital is usually neglected. 
In the Physiocratic system, the basis of efficiency and high productivity are the 
advances. The more intensive use of these advances in the economy is the fundamental 
key to its growth. This is why Marx considers that Quesnay and the Physiocrats were 
the first to have a satisfactory definition of capital and argued that the Physiocrats can 
be considered pioneers in the study of capitalism. In the words of Marx: 
 
“The analysis of capital, within the bourgeois horizon, is essentially the work of the 
Physiocrats.  It is this service that makes them the true fathers of modern political economy”. 
(Marx 1961-63, 352) 
  
In the Grande Culture, the farmer, who is ‘rich’, finances the annual and 
primitive advances, for a value far greater than in the Petite Culture. Only the avances 
foncières are to be financed by the landlord (or the State). The farmer is the organizer of 
production. He uses wage workers to cultivate the land. In the Petite Culture, which 
corresponds to a quasi-feudal mode of production, the advances are financed by the 
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 “Les avances annuelles consistent dans les dépenses qui se font annuellement pour le travail de la 
culture". 
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landlord, usually an aristocrat, who is not concerned with the introduction of new 
techniques. The consequence of the low capital intensity resulting from this attitude is 
low productivity. 
The Grande Culture use of horses, much more efficient, whereas the Petite 
Culture only uses oxen. This is representative of the difference in capital intensity 
between the two types of cultivation. In the words of Quesnay: 
 
“In the Grande Culture, a single man leads a horse-drawn ploughshares which do the same work 
as three ploughshares pulled by oxen and driven by six men: in the latter case, for lack of 
advances in order to establish a large-scale cultivation, the annual expenditure is excessive and 
almost does not give any net income”13. 
(Quesnay 1958, 671) 
 
The Grande Culture should then replace the Petite Culture for the country 
increase its prosperity and be able to compete with England which has a more 
productive agriculture in spite of much less favorable natural conditions than in France. 
The produit net is a key concept in Physiocratic theory. In the words of 
Quesnay, the produit net is defined as follows: 
 
“Product that exceeds the expenses of the work of cultivation, and the expenses of the other 
advances necessary for the operation of that cultivation. All these expenses are refunded by the 
product that they generate, the surplus is net product, which forms the public revenue and the 
income of landlords
14”. 
(Quesnay 1958, 928) 
 
 The produit net is what an economic system produces beyond the level 
necessary for its reproduction. This definition corresponds to the concept of surplus, 
present in all the classical tradition
15
. Unlike the surplus in Petty, the produit net is not a 
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 “Dans la grande culture, un homme seul conduit une charrue tirée par des chevaux, qui fait autant de 
travail que trois charrues tirées par des bœufs, et conduite par six hommes : dans ce dernier cas, faute 
d’avances pour l’établissement d’une grande culture, la dépense annuelle est excessive, et ne rend 
presque point de produit net”. 
14
 "Produit [...] qui excède les dépenses du travail de la culture, et les dépenses des autres avances 
nécessaires pour l’exploitation de cette culture. Toutes ces dépenses étant restituées par le produit 
qu’elles font naître, le surplus est produit net, qui forme le revenu public et le revenu des propriétaires”. 
15
 We adopt the classical conception of the economy developed by Marx and deepened by Sraffa and his 
followers. 
11 
 
just a physical surplus, since it is measured in monetary terms, as the difference 
between the value of production and the value of the necessary expenses. We then have 
the following identity: 
 
Produit Net = Total production - advances  
 
 Quesnay argues that only the agricultural sector is able to create a produit net. 
He estimates that, in the scheme of Grande Culture, the produit net is always equal to 
100% of annual advances. Obviously, the produit net is much larger in the Grande 
Culture than in the Petite Culture. This surplus goes to the landlord class in the form of 
land rent and taxes and to the farmers in the form of profit. 
The advances, which are essential to agricultural production, are in part 
manufactured products. Similarly, manufacturing production requires advances in the 
form of agricultural products and raw materials for the production process. So there is a 
complete interdependence between the city and the countryside, between manufacturing 
industry and agriculture. The recognition of this interdependence was a great 
improvement on Richard Cantillon’s theory, who is generally (and correctly, in our 
view) considered as being the main predecessor of Quesnay (Gilibert 1979; 
Aspromourgos 1996). 
Like Quesnay and the Physiocrats, Cantillon believed that the surplus is 
produced only by agriculture, in the countryside. But, in the theory of Cantillon, cities 
could only survive with the production of food from the countryside, while the 
countryside was basically self-sufficient. Because of that, Cantillon argued that for the 
city (and manufacturing) to prosper, it was necessary for the landowners to develop a 
strong taste for luxury goods. Only this would make the countryside want to increase 
output and produce more food than their own needs and use that extra output to buy 
luxuries made in the cities. 
The Physiocrats are much more sophisticated in their analysis because they show 
the linkage effects between agriculture and other sectors, which are concentrated in the 
cities. They are aware of the necessity of permanent interdependence between the 
sectors to implement an economic system of high productivity in the countryside, like 
the Grande Culture. The high productivity in agriculture is only possible with the 
incorporation of equipment and tools produced by the artisans and manufacturers. 
12 
 
Likewise, artisan and manufacturing sectors can only grow with the increase of 
agricultural production. 
Therefore the real key to Quesnay´s system is neither land nor agriculture as 
such but the Grande culture. The crucial point is the perceived vast technical superiority 
of capitalist agriculture. Capitalist in both the social and the technical sense. Socially, in 
that production should be organized by farmers who advance the capital and hire free 
labor for wages. And technically, in that methods of production that used more 
produced means of production per worker are seen as being much more efficient. 
 
IV. The Social Surplus as a physical quantity of grains 
  
With this historical and theoretical background in mind, we shall make use of a 
very simple and drastically simplified analytical scheme to help us discuss some 
important aspects of Quesnay´s work.  Let us assume that we are studying an economy 
that produces three goods: grains in the agriculture sector and iron and carriages in the 
manufacturing (and trade) urban sector. Production of each of the three goods is made 
using a single method of production that uses only circulating capital, with wages also 
included in the circulating capital advanced (avances annuelles).  
In agriculture, grains are produced using grains as seed and iron (for 
ploughshares and horseshoes) as an input. In the urban sector both the method that 
produces iron and the one that produces carriages use only iron as a direct input. 
Real wages are given at subsistence level and consist only of grains.  Real profits 
per unit of output are also given exogenously, for simplicity as a traditional ‘capitalist 
subsistence’ amount of corn, presumably a much higher amount of corn than that of the 
subsistence of the workers (after all Quesnay spoke of ‘rich’ farmers). The amount of 
real wages per worker and real profits per unit of output is assumed to be given in 
agriculture (grains) and in manufacturing. But they could be different in the 
manufacturing and possibly ‘Colbertist’ urban sector. The important thing is that there 
is no capital mobility between agriculture and manufacturing. Inside the manufacturing 
sector, while there may be some degree of mobility we cannot assume that there is 
enough mobility of capital to equalize total profits as a proportion of capital between the 
production of iron and carriages. We assume that landowners receive the surplus as 
homogenous rents paid in grains in the agricultural sector. Moreover, we shall assume 
13 
 
that all taxes and church tithes are later paid out also in fixed amounts in terms of 
grains. 
In this economy the technical conditions of production can be described as the 
following three methods of production: 
 
grains         a11 , a21 1 
iron            a22 1 
carriages a23 1 
 
where aij are the technical coefficients: a11 for grain per unit of output needed as inputs 
in the production of grains; a21 for iron per unit of output needed as inputs in the 
production of grains; a22 for iron per unit of output needed as inputs in the production of 
iron and a23 for iron per unit of output needed as inputs in the production of carriage. 
Carriages are a luxury (non-basic) consumption good since they are not used as inputs. 
We shall assume that only the production of grain is ‘productive’ in the literal physical 
Physiocratic sense and thus, by conveniently choosing the units of measure of gross 
outputs in such a way that the vector of gross outputs is composed by one unit of each 
of the three goods
16
, we have: 
   
(1) a11 < 1 
 
Accordingly, we shall have to assume that the production of iron, even though it 
is a basic input for grains and hence an indispensable input for (Grande Culture) 
agriculture is technically viable but nevertheless still ‘sterile’ in the sense of not 
producing a physical surplus of itself. Therefore: 
 
(2)  a21 + a22+ a23 = 1 
 
In most formalizations of the ideas of the Physiocrats (by Gilibert 1972; 
Cartelier 1976; Vaggi 1985 and many others)  only two goods are produced and  thus 
one by logic is  forced to assume a positive physical surplus of  manufactured goods in 
order to meet the final demand for manufactured luxuries coming from the landlords. 
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 See Petri (2011). 
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This simplifies the model but is not really compatible with the Physiocratic idea of the 
physically ‘sterile’ character of manufacturing. 
In order to economize on mathematical notation we shall bundle together in the 
augmented technical coefficients of grain a
*
1j all the grain per unit of output needed, not 
only as inputs, but also the subsistence wages of the workers and the subsistence profits 
of the capitalists. We then get the following augmented set of production coefficients: 
 
corn:   a*11 ,a21 1 
iron:   a*12, a22 1 
carriages:  a*13, a23 1 
 
This economy with its given technique and social norms of subsistence for the 
productive classes can only produce a physical surplus above that and thus pay rent 
(and/or ‘surplus’ profits) if we further assume that the technology for producing grain  
is capable of producing a surplus at least big enough so that: 
 
(3) a*11 +a*12 +a*13  <  1 
 
Given all these social and technical conditions, grain and iron are basics in the 
Sraffa sense of being both necessary, directly or indirectly, as inputs or ‘subsistence’ 
goods, for the production of all the three commodities in both sectors. 
In our view, conditions (1) and (2) are the best way to reconstruct Quesnay´s 
argument that the method that produces grain is the only one that produces a physical 
surplus. Despite recent commentators attempts to say otherwise,  Quesnay seems quite 
clear  about this issue  when he writes that “The origin, the principle of each expense 
and of each wealth is the fertility of the soil, whose products only can be multiplied by 
its products themselves
 17” (Quesnay 1958, 892 – quoted in Gilibert 1972, 6). Marx also 
found this great quote from Paoletti, a late Italian follower of the Physiocrats: 
 
“Give the cook a measure of peas, with which he is to prepare your dinner; he will put them on 
the table for you well cooked and well dished up, but in the same quantity as he was given, but 
on the other band give the same quantity to the gardener for him to put into the ground; he will 
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 “L’origine, le principe de toute dépense, et de toute richesse, est la fertilité de la terre, dont on ne peut 
multiplier les produits que par ses produits mêmes”. 
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return to you, when the right time has come, at least fourfold the quantity that he had been 
given.  This is the true and only production”. 
(Marx 1861-3, 234) 
 
This physical surplus of grains appears ‘most palpably’ as a higher quantity of 
the same use values used as inputs.
18
 Note that is precisely because of the physical 
nature of the surplus of grains that some Physiocrats could, when necessary, rationalize 
the produit net (that is usually measured in terms of value) for politico-ideological 
purposes as a ‘gift of nature’19. Note that this does not mean that capital is 
homogeneous in the production of grains (it is not because grain also uses iron as an 
input). This also does not imply denying that the produit net is measured in terms of 
value. It means only that the cultivation of grains is seen as the only sector that is 
capable of producing a physical surplus of its own products. 
 
V. Prices of Production, Bon prix and Prix Fondamental 
 
We have specified the physical technical conditions of production. But in order 
to get to the value of the produit net we must, of course, know something about the 
relative prices. 
Let us then write down the system of general price equations for this economy: 
 
grain     p1=(a*11.p1+ a21.p2)(1+r1)+t1.f.p1 
                                                          
18
 Marx writes: “The difference between the value of labour-power and the value created by it — that is, 
the surplus-value which the purchase of labour-power secures for the user of labour-power — appears 
most palpably, most incontrovertibly, of all branches of production, in agriculture, the primary branch of 
production.  The sum total of the means of subsistence which the labourer consumes from one year to 
another, or the mass of material substance which he consumes, is smaller than the sum total of the means 
of subsistence which he produces.  In manufacture the workman is not generally seen directly producing 
either his means of subsistence or the surplus in excess of his means of subsistence.  The process is 
mediated through purchase and sale, through the various acts of circulation, and the analysis of value in 
general is necessary for it to be understood.  In agriculture it shows itself directly in the surplus of use-
values produced over use-values consumed by the labourer, and can therefore be grasped without an 
analysis of value in general, without a clear understanding of the nature of value.  Therefore also when 
value is reduced to use-value, and the latter to material substance in general.  Hence for the Physiocrats 
agricultural labour is the only productive labour, because it is the only labour that produces a surplus-
value, and rent is the only form of surplus-value which they know. The workman in industry does not 
increase the material substance; he only alters its form” (Marx 1861-3, 224). 
19
 As it seems to have been the case of Mirabeau, the elder. Mirabeau writes: « Le produit provient de 
deux agents combinés. Ces deux agents sont le travail dispendieux de l’homme et le don de la nature » 
(Mirabeau 1760, 368). This quotation can be translated as: “The product comes from two combined 
agents. These agents are costly work of man and the gift of nature”. 
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iron      p2=(a*12.p1+ a22.p2)(1+r2) 
carriages     p3=(a*13.p1+ a23.p2)(1+r3) 
 
where t1 is the land coefficient (hectares per unit of output) and f the uniform rate of 
rent per hectare, and the ri´s are the rates of surplus profits. 
Note that, since the subsistence consumption of capitalists is already included in 
the augmented technical coefficients our three rates of surplus profits refer to ‘extra’ or 
‘surplus’ rate of profits over and above the minimum that would just pay the usual 
‘subsistence’ profits of capitalists (that Marx calls a sort of necessary wage for the 
capitalists). Thus, capitalists and capitalism can survive and prosper even when all rates 
of surplus profit happen to be equal to zero. 
The price system written above has three equations and seven unknowns, 
namely, the rate of rent (f) the three rates of  surplus  profits (r1 , r2 , r3) and the three 
prices of the  goods (p1, p2, p3). If we take grain as the numeraire (p1=1) we reduce this 
to six unknowns. If we further get rid of the non-basic carriages, whose price can be left 
to be calculated after we sort out the relative price between grain and iron, we are 
reduced to two equations and four unknowns, namely, the relative price of iron, rent per 
hectare, and two rates of surplus profit: 
 
(4) 1=(a*11+a21 .p2)(1+r1)+t1.f  
(5) p2=(a*12 + a22 .p2)(1+r2) 
 
Equations (4) and (5) tell us that, given the real wage and the technology, there 
is a potential conflict between rents, the profits in agriculture (grains), and profits in 
iron. The higher is the relative price of grain (i.e., the lower is p2) the higher can be the 
rents and/or the farmers surplus profits. This seems to be the idea behind the doctrine of 
the Bon Prix (proper price). The doctrine of the Bon prix is the argument that potential 
free foreign competition and actual lowering of domestic barriers to trade (toll roads, 
local trade monopolies, etc.) would lower the surplus profits rate r2 and thus allow more 
of the physical surplus of grain to be appropriated by the productive (r1) and/or 
proprietary classes (f).  
There seems to be a consensus that the doctrine of the bon prix for grains meant 
to reduce the relative price of manufactures in general to its prix fondamental, which 
here means the price of iron p2 calculated with r2 equal to zero.  So when there are no 
17 
 
surplus profits in manufacturing iron, iron is sold at its ‘fundamental price’ and grain is 
sold at a bon prix. 
On the other hand, there is a debate about what to call the relative price of grain 
when both the rates of surplus profits r1 and r2 are set to zero and then the whole surplus 
of grain is appropriated by rent and f reaches its maximum
20
. 
Many authors (Higgs 1897; Salleron 
21
; Meek 1962 [1993]
22
; Cartelier 1976; 
Gilibert 1979) argue that in this case the relative price of grains is much higher than its 
prix fondamental because it is paying a lot of rent. These authors defend the idea that 
the fundamental price includes only the technical and subsistence necessary cost of 
production of commodities and cannot include rents. If the price of grains covers rent 
then it must be a bon prix. 
On the other hand, Vaggi (1983, 1987; see also the critical reviews by Cartelier 
1991 and Gilibert 1989) has argued that we should call the grain price with zero surplus 
profits in all sectors and maximum rent included as the prix fundamental for grain. 
However, Quesnay himself gives the following definition of the prix 
fondamental: 
 
“The fundamental price of commodities is determined by the expenses or costs which have to be 
incurred in their production or preparation. If they are sold for less than they have cost, their 
price sinks to a level at which a loss is made. If they are sold at a price which is high enough to 
yield a gain sufficient to encourage people to maintain or increase their production, they are at 
their proper price
23”.  
(Quesnay 1958, 529; Meek 1962 [1993], 93) 
 
Vaggi considers that if rents are not paid, there will be a loss and, therefore, 
rents should be a part of the prix fondamental.  In this view the bon prix would always 
include positive profits for the farmers. There are a few problems with Vaggi´s 
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 Note that carriages are  non-basic and r3 also does not affect the distribution of the surplus of grain. 
21
 The fundamental price is defined by Salleron as "expression habituelle pour signifier le prix de revient, 
le coût de production" (Quesnay 1958, 529). This quotation can be translated as: “common expression to 
mean the factory cost, the cost of production”. 
22
 “In the case of agricultural produce, the ‘market value’ was higher than the ‘fundamental price’ by an 
amount equal (roughly) to rent” (Meek 1962 [1993], 389). 
23
 "Le prix fondamental des marchandises est établi par les dépenses, ou les frais qu’il faut faire, pour 
leurs productions, ou pour leur préparation. Si elles se vendent moins qu’elles n’ont coûté, leur prix 
dégénère en perte, si elles se vendent assez cher, pour procurer un gain suffisant pour exciter à en 
entretenir ou à en augmenter la production, elles sont à bon prix". 
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interpretation. The first is that if rents are not paid it is the landowners that incur losses, 
whilst if price sinks below the necessary costs of production it is the farmers that lose 
and they are the ones who organize production. Thus the loss alluded to by Quesnay in 
the passage quoted above seems to be that of the farmer, not of the landowner. Losses 
are “incurred in the production and preparation” of commodities and landowners do 
neither. The second difficulty is that Quesnay mentions in the same passage that the bon 
prix is necessary to favor not only the expansion but also the ‘maintenance’ of 
production. But this logically implies that if the price is below the bon prix as the prix 
fondamental is there will be a contraction of production. Thus a stationary economy 
needs the bon prix, not the prix fondamental. Given these problems we prefer to stick to 
the tradition of considering that rents are not a part of the prix fondamental and that the 
price of grain that includes both costs and rents (whether or not grain surplus profits are 
positive) is the bon prix. This may be seen as a purely terminological issue but in fact it 
appears to be an attempt by Vaggi to argue that positive surplus profit in agriculture 
appears in Physiocratic theory even when the economy is in a stationary state (as in the 
Tableau Économique) and there is no net accumulation of capital, a view which we 
certainly do not subscribe to (see section VII below). 
 
VI. The Vertically Integrated Grain Sector. 
 
This potential conflict between rent and surplus profits becomes much clearer if 
we replace (5) into (4). This makes us calculate what would be the vertically integrated 
grain sector of the economy in which the requirements of iron and the profits in the 
manufacturing sector are being also measured or expressed directly in terms of shares of 
the physical gross product of grain: 
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Here it becomes clear that while in general the rate of rent f depends both on the 
technology and relative prices, if the technique and the rules of distributing the sectoral 
value surplus r1 and r2 are known then the rent f can be ascertained in terms of grain as 
the difference between the gross product and the physical cost in grain production. 
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Moreover, if we happen to be in the particular situation depicted by Quesnay in 
the Tableau Économique, where surplus profits are assumed to have been driven down 
to zero in both iron manufacture and grain agriculture then we can write instead: 
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This concept of a sort of vertically integrated grain sector, where the physical 
surplus of grain is  distributed as rent is probably what Sraffa (1960) meant when he 
spoke as a ‘point of contact’ between Quesnay doctrine of the produit net and Ricardo´s 
‘material rate of produce’ in his the Essay of Profits24. Note that this point of contact, 
although evident, is not exact because according to Sraffa the ‘rational foundation’ of  
Ricardo´s theory of profits is that corn (here grain) is the only basic good, while here we 
have two basics (grain and iron).  
On the other hand, Marx on some occasions explicitly states that the Physiocrats 
thought agriculture did not need inputs from other sectors, but here it is important to 
remember that he is probably talking of the Physiocrats in general, of Turgot (and 
perhaps also Cantillon)
25
 and not necessarily of Quesnay and certainly not of his 
Tableau Économique. Quesnay, as we saw above clearly emphasizes the importance of 
‘iron’ in the Grande Culture of grains, specially (but not only) in the Tableau.  
In fact, Quesnay´s arguments about the passage from Petite Culture to Grande 
Culture can be shown as follows. The Petite Culture does not use iron (a21=0) but has a 
very high a*11, i.e., a small surplus of grain. On the other hand, the Grande Culture uses 
a lot of iron (a21>0) but even taking into account how much the iron costs in terms of 
grain the total grain costs are much lower such that the following conditions are 
assumed to hold : 
 
In the Petite Culture: 1__*11 
CulturePetitea   
                                                          
24
  Sraffa says: “Ricardo’s view of the dominant role of the farmer’s profits thus appears to have a point 
of contact with the Physiocratic doctrine of the ‘produit net’ in so far as the latter is based, as Marx has 
pointed out, on the ‘physical nature’ of the surplus in agriculture which takes the form of an excess of 
food produced over the food advanced for production ; whereas in manufacturing, where food and raw 
materials must be bought from agriculture, a surplus can only appear as a result of the sale of the product” 
(Sraffa 1960, 93). 
25
 See Kurz & Gehrke 1998. 
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Note that a high rate of surplus profits in ‘iron’ manufacturing is the only thing 
that could wipe out the advantages of Grande Culture. No wonder then that the 
Physiocrats worried about the bon prix in agriculture depending on the reduction of the 
manufactured prices to its prix fundamental (r2=0). 
Marx mentions how contradictory is Quesnay´s objective materialist analysis of 
the higher yield of the Grande Culture as being connected with methods that use more 
produced inputs (horses with metal plough instead of cows with wooden ones for 
instance) and the doctrine of the surplus as a ‘gift of nature’, that he attributes to 
Mirabeau, the Elder. 
Note that it would be very odd for Marx to praise Quesnay  so much for 
introducing the analogue of his concept of constant capital  and to perceive the 
revolutionary importance of the used of produced manufactured inputs in agriculture 
and then ignore that modern agriculture and manufacture were interdependent. In any 
case equation (7) is valid whether we assume sectoral interdependence or assume 
instead the absolute strategic predominance of agriculture (a21=0), as Cantillon and 
(sometimes at least) Turgot appear to have done (something that would contradict 
Quesnay’s definition of Grande Culture). 
In any case, the popular argument according to which Marx (or Sraffa for that 
matter) thought that the doctrine of the produit net meant that Physiocrats ignored or 
had nothing to say about relative prices and only thought in physical terms seems to us 
totally without foundation.
26
 Marx was obviously talking about technical and social 
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 Some authors in the Marxist tradition seem to actually interpret the Physiocrats in this way. For 
instance Napoleoni writes that "the problem of evaluation is present in the Physiocrats in its most 
primitive form, i.e. not as a measure of the difference between two magnitudes of value, but rather, as a 
measure of the difference between two physical quantities" (Napoleoni 1983, 27). He adds: "When the 
Physiocrats present the problem of measuring the produit net (surplus) with the aim of building their 
quantitative framework, this problem is solved empirically, taking as given the market prices” (Napoleoni 
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conditions (1) and (3) above when he talked about the physical surplus of use values. 
On the other hand, even if we adopt the extreme version in which the only basic good is 
grain (if a21=0) there would still be the relative prices of the non-basic goods (iron and 
carriages in our case) to be ascertained.  The point is that   the vertically integrated grain 
sector, with or without interdependencies, is strictly necessary to determine the rate of 
rent without which we cannot possibly know the price of grain nor any of the other 
relative prices. On the other hand, the authors who insist that the Physiocratic theory of 
the produit net is all based on money and market prices are of course incapable of 
explaining why the physical productivity of agriculture is so important for the 
Physiocrats, because they have no way of relating the physical surplus and the social 
rules for distributing it between rent and profits and the relative price system. If these 
interpreters are right the Physiocrats were then either similar to ‘mercantilists’ who 
explained the surplus in value in terms of ‘buying cheap and selling dear’ or even 
worse, what Marx called ‘Vulgar economists’ which did nothing apart from trying to 
‘explain prices with prices’. Moreover, if the physical surplus was irrelevant for the 
Physiocrats, one would wonder why they insisted on saying that agriculture was 
productive and manufacturing sterile. It is clear that the physical surplus is necessary for 
the produit net in value to be positive. It is extremely doubtful that the Physiocrats did 
not understand the simple idea that if the value of the necessary consumption were 
enough to buy the whole physical amount of products then there could be no value 
surplus. 
In another curious attempt to disconnect the notion of physical surplus from the 
notion of value surplus in the theories of the old classical economists, Brewer has 
argued that: 
 
“Although a physical notion of surplus […] must clearly underlie Quesnay’s system, it is not at 
all clear that he understood the relationships involved. If he had, he could surely not have 
claimed, as he did, that an increase in agricultural prices would increase the surplus. In his own 
framework, this does not make sense. If non-agricultural prices cover costs, they must rise in 
line with any increase in agricultural prices, so the produit net is unchanged in real terms”.  
(Brewer 2008, 20) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1983, 26). Neither of the two statements can be sustained. The first would mean that capital is 
homogenous in agriculture (and it is not in Grande Culture). The second would mean that Physiocrats 
had no theoretical notion of prices and of course they had the prix fondamental and the bon prix. 
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There are two alternatives. Either Quesnay really does not understand his own 
notion of produit net or perhaps Brewer has not noticed that when Quesnay argues that 
high relative prices of grain increase profits he is talking about a situation in which the 
price of manufactures is above the prix fondamental and there are surplus profits in 
‘iron’ (r2 > 0 in equation (7) above) that could be reduced to increase agricultural 
surplus profits and/or rents . In other words, Quesnay doctrine of the bon prix for grains 
may be  instead based precisely on the fact that non agricultural prices do not just cover 
costs, as he thought they should. 
 
VII. Capital accumulation, Profits and the Tableau Économique 
 
It is important to note the connection between the question of the distribution of 
the surplus between profits and rents and the analysis of the process of capital 
accumulation. Quesnay appeared to think in terms of a process of capital accumulation 
with the diffusion of the Grande Culture technique in the production of grain until it 
reaches the limits given by the total amount of arable land in the agricultural kingdom. 
In fact he seems to think of a limit such as: 
 
TXt 11    
 
where X1 is the gross output of grain and T is the amount of land that can be cultivated 
to produce corn. The maximum level of grain gross output, at which the maximum 
amount of net output is also reached, is given by: 
 
 (8) 
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Note that Quesnay does not say but this limit could in principle be increased by 
further technical change that allowed a higher level of grain output per hectare. In the 
specific situation depicted in the Tableau Économique this process of diffusion has been 
completed and the land constraint (8) has been reached. In the “Analyse de la Formule 
Arithmétique du Tableau Économique” (Analysis of the Arithmetic Formula of the 
Tableau Économique), Quesnay gives the main features of the economy described in the 
Tableau: 
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“Let us assume, then, a large kingdom whose territory, fully cultivated by the best possible 
methods, yields every year a reproduction to the value of five milliards; and in which the 
permanent maintenance of this value is ensured by the constant prices which are current among 
trading nations, in a situation where there is unremitting free competition in trade and complete 
security of property in the wealth employed in agriculture
27
". 
(Quesnay 1958, 794-795; Meek 1962 [1993], 151) 
 
Thus, in the Tableau, the economy has reached a final stationary state with zero 
net accumulation of capital. 
Of course, in that final Tableau stationary state, surplus profits are zero because 
capitalists only consume and there is no need for further accumulation and we get: 
 
(4´)    grain        1=a*11+a21.p2+t1.f   
(5´)    iron             p2=a*12 + a22.p2 
(9)   carriages     p3=a*13+ a23.p2  
 
In this situation there is complete symmetry between the physical surplus of 
grain and the distribution of the surplus by the relative price system because in this case, 
and only in this case, the physical surplus that is created in agriculture and is wholly 
appropriated by the landlords. 
Note that if the rate of surplus profits in   manufacturing of iron or carriages 
were to be positive the surplus, in spite of being still created physically only in the 
production of grains would be in part appropriated by producers of iron and/or 
carriages. On the other hand, if the rate surplus   profits in the grain sector were positive, 
part of the surplus of grain would be appropriated by the grain farmers. In all these 
cases the symmetry between the conditions of production of the surplus and its 
appropriation (distribution) would break down.  
Moreover, outside the stationary state this system of prices of production does 
not seem adequate. For on the route to the final stationary state, the demand for all 
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 “Supposons donc un grand royaume dont le territoire porté à son plus haut degré d’agriculture, 
rapporterait tous les ans une reproduction de la valeur de cinq milliards ; et où l’état permanent de cette 
valeur serait établi sur les prix constants qui ont cours entre les nations commerçantes, dans le cas où il y 
a constamment une libre concurrence de commerce, et une entière sûreté de la propriété des richesses 
d’exploitation de l’agriculture”. 
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goods will be increasing and the advances of both corn and iron must grow period after 
period for the production of all three commodities. If the production of these 
commodities is to catch up with the growing demand for them, there must be net 
investment. But if we assume that the landlords themselves do not invest (at most they 
make the avances primitives on infrastructure)  and that workers live on subsistence 
wages, we then must have positive surplus profits during the process of capital 
accumulation, not as temporary effect of an imbalance between effectual demand and 
the quantity brought to market, that would cause an equally temporary deviation of 
current or market prices from the ‘prices of production’, but as permanent component of 
the prices of production of all commodities.  
Note that this conclusion does not depend on who finances those investments in 
each branch of the economy. Even if landlords lent part of their surplus to capitalists in 
general the prices of production would have to incorporate a rate of profits high enough 
to pay back the interest on those loans plus some minimum risk premia. But that is 
definitely not what Quesnay assumes. Since we have also assumed that there is no 
capital mobility across agriculture and manufacturing we know that the three rates of 
surplus profit do not have to be the same. If there is growth and accumulation we know 
these rates must be positive. But we have no way of ascertaining their level. It could be 
tempting to argue that the surplus profit rates in the production of each commodity 
should be equal to the rate of growth of the demand   for each of them. But   even 
without capital mobility if there is some competition among producers of the same 
good, we cannot ensure that. For different grain farms   could be growing at different 
rates, and it does not make sense to assume that the farm that wants to grow more will 
be able to charge a higher price than rival, slower growing farms. The same argument 
would apply for different producers of iron and carriages. 
 Thus, the only reasonable conclusion is that, outside the final stationary state, 
we know that the various rates of surplus of profit will be positive. But we have no clear 
criteria in the original texts of Quesnay on what should be their exact levels.  
 
VIII. Final Remarks 
 
The upshot of the whole discussion is that Quesnay was clearly dealing with a 
capitalist economy or at very least that there was capitalism in the agricultural sector. 
Marx was completely wrong when said that capitalists in agriculture were paid 
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functionaries of the landowners
28
. They were not paid by landlords. The landlords were 
paid by them. They rented the land exactly as Ricardo´s farmers did. The big difference 
here is the lack of free capital mobility, not of capitalism as such
29
. Quesnay also made 
the typically classical intimate connection between (surplus) profits and the 
accumulation of capital, with capitalists being the key investors of the system. But this 
has been lost for in the particular conditions of the Tableau Économique, net 
accumulation of capital has come to an end and profits are down to their minimum 
‘subsistence’ level.  
Quesnay had not developed yet the notion of the general (uniform) rate of 
profits, nor separated clearly within profits the wages and salaries of management from 
the pure income from advancing capital. That was left for Turgot and Smith. He also did 
not have a complete theory of how the surplus would be divided between rent and 
sectoral profits outside the final stationary state depicted in the Tableau. That had to 
wait until Ricardo´s notion of differential rent. But in our view it is a serious mistake to 
argue that there was anything ‘feudal’ about his system30. The fact that Quesnay thought 
of profits as part of necessary consumption whilst rents are part of the surplus and the 
implied conclusion that all taxes should fall on rents may easily show that his main 
                                                          
28
 “The Physiocrats…regarded rent as the only surplus, and capitalists and labourers together merely as 
the paid employees of the landlord” (Marx in Aspromourgos 1996, 122). 
29
 Quesnay certainly did not assume free capital mobility across sectors but what about inside fully 
capitalist agriculture as between producers of grain and wine, for instance? It may be tempting to assume 
that within  capitalist agriculture competition could make the rates of surplus profits   equal   for Quesnay 
writes in the Maximes Générales du Gouvernement Économique d’un Royaume Agricole (General 
Maxims of the Economic Government of an Agricultural Kingdom): 
“Que chacun soit libre de cultiver dans son champ telles productions que son intérêt, ses facultés, la 
nature du terrain lui suggèrent pour en tirer le plus grand produit possible" (Quesnay 1958, 952-953).  
This quotation was translated by Meek (1962 [1993], 234) as: “That each person should be free to 
cultivate in his fields such produce as his interests, his means, and the nature of the land suggest to him, in 
order that he may extract from them the greatest possible product”. 
However, in a note to the same text he also writes that :  
“ La culture des vignes est la plus riche culture du royaume de France ; car le produit net d’un arpent de 
vignes, évalué du fort au faible, est environ le triple de celui du meilleurs arpent de terre cultivé en grain" 
(Quesnay 1958, 966). This quotation was translated by Meek (1962 [1993], 249) as: “The cultivation of 
vineyards is the most wealthy branch of cultivation in the French kingdom, for the net product of an 
arpent of land given over to vineyards, valued on an average basis, is about three times that of an arpent 
of the best land given over to the cultivation of corn”. 
Therefore, there is no clear textual basis for such an assumption. 
30
 Most of Marx´s passages in the Theory of Surplus Value on the feudal aspect of Physiocracy are quite 
explicitly ironic but a few give the impression of being serious and therefore inadequate. Matters are not 
helped by some apologetic remarks by other Physiocrats such as Mirabeau, the elder. 
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concern was to guarantee the profitability of modern capitalist agriculture, which he 
argued was the key to French prosperity.  
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